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Abstract
Studies of policy bubbles have so far ignored the possibility that a policy bubble in a given 
policy domain or jurisdiction may constitute an information event for another policy bubble 
that has been inflated elsewhere. In addition, studies of policy diffusion have paid little atten-
tion to the transmission of imperfect and wrongful policy valuations through social networks. 
To bridge these gaps, this article develops a theoretical framework and methodological toolbox 
for explaining the potential impact of interbubble dynamics on the sustainment of policy bub-
bles. This is achieved by focusing on: (i) the diffusion of interbubble connectivity information 
through social networks characterized by varying levels of segregation; (ii) the perceptions of 
distorted or corrected information by individuals at the receiving end as being factual, thus 
requiring no gap-filling by policy actors, or as an opinion that therefore requires gap-filling; 
(iii) the derived consequence in terms of simple or complex contagion; and (iv) its impact on 
the sustainment of policy bubbles. The main contribution of the article lies in unpacking the 
potential causal mechanisms through which a policy bubble can be sustained, even if positive 
feedback processes and contagion in the jurisdiction within which it developed no longer bol-
ster its support bases. 
Keywords
interbubble dynamics, connectivity information, social networks, network segregation
International Review of Public Policy,
Vol. 2, N°1, 24-44, 2020, https://doi.org/10.4000/irpp.774
A prior version of this article was presented at the 4th International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP4), 
Concordia University, 26th-28th June 2019. I thank Dan Miodownik, Christopher Weible, Falk Daviter and 
the anonymous referees for insightful comments. I also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the 
Israel Science Foundation under grant 616/17.
25M a o r  |  A  s o c i a l  n e t wo rk  p e rs p e ct ive  on  the  in te ra ct ion  b e t wee n p ol i c y  b ubble s 
In recent years there has been growing interest in the efficiency of policymakers in matching 
the intensity of policy tools to the intensity of problems in the long term. In this regard, one 
of the most intriguing complex public-policy phenomena is that of policy bubbles. Jones et al. 
(2014), as well as Maor (2014), defined and conceptualized this phenomenon as a policy over-
investment or overreaction that is sustained by positive feedback processes and contagion over 
a relatively long time period. Furthermore, preliminary findings, based on “likely examples” 
of policy bubbles, have revealed that US crime policy, as well as contracting and privatization, 
constituted bubbles (Jones et al. 2014). Moving beyond this basic finding has proved difficult 
and, in fact, no empirical study to date has systematically identified and examined policy bub-
bles, or developed a reliable and useful methodology for measuring these phenomena. These 
lacunae notwithstanding, this conceptual article unpacks the potential causal mechanisms 
through which a policy bubble can be sustained — even if self-reinforcing processes and con-
tagion in the jurisdiction wherein it developed no longer bolster its support base — in order to 
guide scholars who seek to address the aforementioned empirical gaps.
Studies of policy bubbles have so far analyzed standalone bubbles by focusing mainly on the 
policy domain as the unit of analysis. Little attention has been devoted to the connective tis-
sue that may exist between policy bubbles, namely the shared information set that potentially 
links one policy bubble to another. Drawing on this idea, the present article develops a theo-
retical framework and methodological toolbox for the study of interbubble dynamics. The ana-
lytical framework focuses on: the diffusion of interbubble connectivity information through 
social networks characterized by varying levels of segregation; the perceptions of distorted 
or corrected information by individuals at the receiving end as being factual, thus requiring 
no gap-filling by policy actors, or as an opinion that therefore require gap-filling; the derived 
consequence in terms of simple or complex contagion; and its impact on policy bubble sustain-
ment.
The article is structured as follows. The next section introduces a motivational example; the 
second reviews existing scholarly literature on policy bubbles; and the third describes the ana-
lytical premises, components and considerations underlying the study of interbubble dynam-
ics. The sections thereafter outline the theoretical framework and the derived hypotheses. The 
methodological section subsequently proposes three research strategies. The last section sug-
gests avenues for future research.
Motivational Example
A salient example of a shared information set linking one policy bubble to another is the culture 
of fear — exacerbated by media coverage adopting the immigration threat narrative — that 
was highly evident during the 1990s and 2000s as the US experienced a period of heightened 
activity in three policy domains. First, were the domains of crime and punishment — leading to 
a policy bubble (Jones et al. 2014). Second, was the domain of immigration — leading to record 
deportations during the Obama administration and an unprecedented rise in anti-immigrant 
legislation at state level in the period between 2005 and 2012 (e.g., Ybarra et al. 2016). And 
third, there was the policy domain of education within those states with large and swiftly grow-
ing Latino populations (i.e., those with the greatest need for public spending) — leading to a 
negative policy bubble that manifested in a long-term propensity to disinvest in this policy 
area (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). 
The culture of fear of immigrants provided a foundation upon which threat narratives — sto-
ries, songs, jokes, theories and explanations that have “emotional resonance and that can eas-
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ily be conveyed in casual conversation” (Shiller 2019, xi) — were formulated by policy actors 
and transmitted from one domain to another. These false narratives solidified (Andreas 2000; 
Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Chavez 2008; Martinez-Brawley and Zorita 2018; Massey and Pren 
2012), enhancing the misalignment between public perceptions about the policy problem, on 
the one hand, and data regarding the severity of the problem, on the other. The culture of fear 
may have also lowered the forgetting rate (Shiller 2019) of these narratives. 
The analytical value of modeling this process becomes more pronounced when considering the 
transmission of housing bubbles through the credit market to other economic sectors. Based 
on data from the massive boom-bust cycle in Spanish housing prices between 1995 and 2015, 
Martín, Moral-Benito and Schmitz (2019) found that “housing bubbles initially crowd out 
credit from other sectors, but eventually — if they last long enough — crowd it in [by providing 
collateral or attractive assets for securitization].” The culture of fear in the aforementioned exam-
ple may have operated as a symbolic and ideational credit market. It easily enabled policy actors to 
build up false policy narratives that resonated emotionally and these, in turn, crowded out cor-
rect policy valuations because they were more contagious. Furthermore, these narratives may 
have continued to affect policy investment long after they were corrected because they were 
more contagious. The culture of fear, therefore, may have linked different policy domains, refo-
cusing individuals’ attention and policy investment decisions on policy problems whose value 
could easily be distorted by triggering threat narratives. Traditional policy bubble theories do 
not offer a model for this process.
Policy Bubbles: Relevant Literature
A critical aspect of policy development over time is policymakers’ inability to respond propor-
tionally to information that indicates a change in a problem’s severity. As leverage, the concept 
of policy bubbles has entered the policy lexicon (Jones et al. 2014; Maor 2014) and has been 
defined in terms of sustained policy overinvestment, which occurs when a government invests 
in a single policy instrument beyond its instrumental value in achieving a policy goal (adapted 
from Jones et al. 2014, 149), or sustained policy overreaction, which is a policy that “impose[s] 
objective and/or perceived social costs without producing offsetting objective and/or perceived 
benefits” (Maor 2012, 235). 
To facilitate the distinction between the phenomenon and its explanation, Maor (2019, 14) 
recently defined the term as “a socio-psychological phenomenon which occurs when policy 
overinvestment or overproduction due to distorted policy valuation is sustained by positive 
feedback processes and contagion over an extended period of time.” Distortion of policy valua-
tion occurs when political and/or policy interests shape the presentation of policy-relevant sci-
entific facts, which are based on objective measures, to fit distinct models of “reality” (Jasanoff 
1987, 195; Nisbet and Mooney 2007; Oreskes and Conway 2010; Pielke 2007), thereby under-
mining an accurate assessment of the risks and benefits associated with the policy instrument 
at hand. Recently, the notion of policy bubbles was conceptually extended by focusing on the 
role of emotions in processes of sustained policy underreaction, termed negative policy bub-
bles (Maor 2016). 
Studies of policy bubbles have so far analyzed standalone bubbles by focusing mainly on the 
policy domain as the unit of analysis (Jones et al. 2014; Maor 2014; Baumgartner 2015; Behn 
et al. 2015; Gillard and Lock 2017). Little attention has been devoted, however, to the poten-
tial connective tissue between policy bubbles, namely the shared (factual and/or symbolic/
ideational) information set that potentially links one policy bubble to another. This may have 
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occurred because the concept of a policy bubble is itself relatively new, or because this phenom-
enon appears to be an instance of path dependencies and policy legacies interfering with poli-
cymakers’ efficiency in reflecting genuine supply and demand for policies. Jones et al. (2014) 
went even further, omitting the symbolic and ideational components in the definition of a 
policy’s instrumental value, although recognizing that “[p]olicies may come to be valued (or 
devalued) for reasons that may have little to do with the ability of the policy to affect goals, 
because much of politics is conducted at the symbolic or ideological level” (Jones et al. 2014, 
149). This omission, in turn, has directed the radar away from the potential influences that one 
bubble may have on another. Once one recognizes that policy bubbles may share an informa-
tion set, a new causal mechanism for the sustainment of policy bubbles emerges.
Yet, before conceptually uncovering this potential causal mechanism, an important question is 
in order: Given the expansive literature on policy diffusion — defined as the “process through 
which political [or policy] phenomena spread from one jurisdiction to another” (Karch et al. 
2016, 83), why do we need a theoretical framework dealing particularly with diffusion in re-
lation to policy bubbles? This is necessary because diffusion explanations in policy sciences 
focus on: (i) governments’ adoption of new policies (Berry and Berry 2018, 254) rather than 
the sustainment of new or old policy bubbles; (ii) intergovernmental dynamics rather than 
socio-psychological processes at the societal and elite levels; (iii) accurate policy information 
or perceptions thereof (Shipan and Volden 2008; Gilardi 2010; Seljan and Weller 2011), rather 
than distorted policy valuations that shape policy perceptions; and (iv) the spread of informa-
tion rather than the spread of behaviors (Centola 2018), which may be highly important when 
an ends-means relationship between the intensity of the policy problem and the intensity of 
the policy instrument is replaced by a self-sustaining process. Current diffusion studies tell us 
little about: the kinds of social networks that are best suited to spreading imperfect or wrong 
information regarding a policy; the specific features of the network structure that affect the 
diffusion of distorted information, which cannot easily be corrected; and the diffusion of be-
havior, which does not follow the disease theory of diffusion (Centola 2018). 
Interbubble Dynamics: Analytical Premises, Components and 
Considerations 
Underlying this conceptual article is the premise that, by abstracting from a policy system in 
order to explain a standalone policy bubble, we risk severely misunderstanding the full spec-
trum of factors that may determine the sustainment of policy bubbles. To counteract this ten-
dency, we require a deep understanding of: (i) how policy-relevant information and behaviors 
spread; (ii) which aspects of a policy’s distorted valuation enhance or impede diffusion; and (iii) 
which aspects of the network’s topology enhance or impede diffusion. 
The analytical framework advanced here draws on one of the major findings emerging from 
empirical and theoretical analyses of how social structure relates to behavior: social-network 
structure affects how information flows, what access individuals have to various types of in-
formation, how policy choices are made and how actions are diffused. Notable examples have 
been recorded in sociology (e.g., Granovetter 1985; Smelser and Swedberg 2005), economics 
(see the review in Goyal 2016; Jackson 2016), and politics, public policy, public administration 
and international relations (see the review in Victor et al. 2018). Likewise, fruitful investiga-
tions concerning the effects of social networks on policy outcomes have been published during 
the last two decades (for a review, see Boucher and Fortin 2016, 280–3; see also Desmarais et 
al. 2015). 
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The analytical framework integrates a variety of policy actors, including policy entrepreneurs 
— individual or collective actors who seek to bring about policy changes that either alter the 
status quo in given policy domains (e.g. Kingdon 1984) or block such changes (Ackrill and Kay 
2011). Policy entrepreneurs influence information flows by gathering, centralizing, shaping 
and distorting information, as well as by strategically disseminating that information to policy 
participants (for a review, see Boasson and Huitema 2017; see also Maor 2017). In addition, 
a crucial function includes the delivery of information to decision-makers who need guidance 
in making sense of ambiguous policy problems (e.g., Kingdon 1984). Recently, Arnold et al. 
(2017) found that “the ability to access and deploy novel, policy-relevant information and re-
sources is particularly important when policy entrepreneurs are seeking to disrupt a policy 
equilibrium [...]” (p. 433). 
The analytical framework follows Baumgartner and Jones’s (2015, 15) broad definition of in-
formation as referring not merely to statistical evidence but also to qualitative information 
regarding the policy problem, the solution and the policy process itself, as well as to beliefs that 
motivate professionals and mobilize the public. The analytical framework also accords pride 
of place to the socio-psychological dimension in information diffusion, the importance of an 
idea’s emotional quality (Cox and Béland 2013) and the derived leverage enjoyed by emotional 
entrepreneurs (Maor 2017; Maor and Gross 2015). These elements have recently been high-
lighted in a study concerning polarizing issues in US public-policy debates over gun control, 
same-sex marriage and climate change. The study demonstrated that the presence of moral-
emotional words in messages increased their diffusion by a factor of 20% for each additional 
word and that moral-emotional language increased diffusion more strongly within liberal and 
conservative networks and less strongly between the two networks (Brady et al. 2017). Skillful 
policy entrepreneurs can therefore use social networks to influence flows of distorted policy 
valuations and, thereby, policy perceptions at the societal and elite levels. Further, introducing 
emotions into interbubble dynamics highlights the possibility that the source (bubble) and the 
recipient (bubble) may not be purely coincidental, because policy investment in some policy 
areas may be more vulnerable to emotion regulation by emotional entrepreneurs. 
In the analytical framework, much weight is placed on the spread of human behaviors. When 
policy response is not directly sensitive to changes in the rate or severity of the policy prob-
lem over an extended period of time, attention should be directed toward the behaviors of 
policy actors and individuals involved in this self-sustaining process (e.g., political participa-
tion; policy compliance). Studies have demonstrated that behavior simply does not spread in 
the way that information does. They also show that different types of networks confer different 
kinds of benefits and disadvantages. Perhaps most relevant to our study is the differentiation 
between simple contagions which can be spread by a single contact — such as measles or a tweet 
(e.g., a new policy belief, fad, or fashion), in a process that often involves minimal effort or 
cost — and complex contagions which require social reinforcement (e.g., nudges) from multiple 
neighboring contacts in a social network (Centola and Macy 2007; Centola 2018) in a pro-
cess that may be costly. Local processes of social reinforcement, which are involved in complex 
contagions, may also be time-consuming, especially when some individuals require numerous 
recommendations and others refrain from action until every single person they know — which 
may amount to tens or hundreds — has acquired the information and acted upon it. Weighing 
adopters against non-adopters by reputation-sensitive individuals and policy actors may make 
individuals relatively conservative and less likely to act on the information that they acquired 
early on (Centola 2018). 
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Understanding the puzzling aspect of interbubble dynamics thus requires a more nuanced 
theoretical approach than the “orthodox” policy-diffusion explanations. We cannot impose the 
default way of thinking about the transmission of policy ideas — which uses epidemiology as 
a reference point because of its convenience, while disregarding the role of social reinforce-
ment — especially when we know that human behavior is involved in self-sustaining processes 
in policy development and that human beings are wary of manipulation on social media and 
other outlets. 
The Analytical Framework
The premises underlying this conceptual article are that: (i) policymakers’ efficiency in match-
ing the intensity of the policy instrument to the intensity of problems over the long-term can 
only be defined relative to an information set and a timescale, similar to market efficiency 
(Sohn and Sornette 2017); (ii) dynamic social networks are interconnected rather than isolat-
ed, that is, a given social network depends on the dynamic processes that occur in some other 
social networks; and (iii) the causes of policy problems are “matters of interpretation and social 
definition” (Cobb and Elder 1983, 172). Given a shared information set, a policy bubble in a 
certain policy domain or jurisdiction may constitute an information event for another policy 
bubble that has inflated elsewhere. 
An information event in a policy system which shares an information set with another policy 
system refers to the diffusion of new information through a social context that can potentially 
change people’s sensitivities regarding policy-related aspects at the receiving end. One exam-
ple is information contagion which spreads fears from one network to another. Another is 
contagion through interlinked or related public goods and strategies, for instance when some 
governments are forced either to reduce/stop or begin/accelerate the production of certain 
public goods, leading to cascades of losses/gains which spread, through exposure, to common 
factors. Consequently, a policy bubble in a given domain could potentially cause a gradual or, 
alternatively, a large and sudden inflation or deflation of a policy bubble in the same domain 
elsewhere (i.e., in another jurisdiction), or in another policy domain in the same jurisdiction or 
elsewhere. This may be the case particularly when information contains contagious narratives 
that are largely creative and innovative, or that resonate emotionally, and are therefore easily 
transmitted from one policy bubble to another. 
The framework advanced here incorporates independent variables on two different levels: (1) 
bubble-bubble (or interbubble) connectivity information as perceived by network members; 
and (2) the social-network structure. For the former, interbubble connectivity information refers 
to policy-relevant information transmitted from one bubble to another. This information may 
reflect either a correct policy valuation or a distorted one and each of these policy valuations 
may be perceived as either a fact or as an opinion. This focus on perceptions of information 
is analytically necessary because differentiating between facts, which help us to determine 
whether something is true or false, and opinion — which reflects the beliefs and values of who-
ever expresses it — has proved a challenge for large segments of society. A recent survey found 
that Republicans and Democrats in the US are more likely to think that news statements are 
factual when they appeal to their side — even if they are opinions (Pew Research Center 2018). 
The theoretical framework advanced here focuses on distorted interbubble connectivity infor-
mation because the direction of change in interbubble dynamics is not obvious, as is likely in 
the case of correct information which is perceived as fact and is most likely to facilitate bub-
ble termination. Accurate interbubble connectivity information that is perceived by network 
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members as an opinion is fully integrated into the analytical framework. 
Distorted interbubble connectivity information that is perceived by individuals as fact allows 
for no (or very little) gap-filling by policy actors and/or by ordinary people. This characteristic 
has two consequences. First, regarding network hub function, this distorted valuation is likely 
to be transmitted via simple contagion: hubs are likely to become infected early on because 
they have many contacts and, once infected, are likely to act as accelerants, simply spreading 
the “infected” information to everyone they know (Centola and Macy 2007). Second, the be-
haviors of policy entrepreneurs and other policy actors may remain passive or be understood 
as exogenous because no gap-filling is required. Furthermore, when distorted information is 
perceived as a fact, it leaves relatively little leeway for highly connected policy actors to ma-
nipulate information in order to shift the opinions and actions of others deliberately. Social 
networks that are exposed to distorted interbubble connectivity information that is perceived 
as fact may therefore lack the additional layer of strategic interactions (e.g., Jackson 2008).
In contrast, when distorted interbubble connectivity information is perceived as an opinion, 
people must interpret the information they receive from others, compare it with other opin-
ions that they encounter and decide with whom to conform. In other words, the perception of 
distorted interbubble connectivity information as an opinion opens a window for gap-filling by policy 
actors that aims to provide answers to questions posed by network members, such as: Is the 
policy instrument used properly?; Is this the right policy instrument? The answers to these 
questions — one relating to the intensity or scale of use, the other to the type of policy instru-
ment used — may change policy dynamics and, at times, also the dynamic of contagion. 
Regarding policy dynamics, changes in the salience assessment of a policy by policymakers, 
citizens, interest groups and the media may lead to an alteration in the level of mobilization 
(e.g., because of a change in the inclination to test new ideas) and in the cognitive commit-
ment of citizens, social groups and public officials to the policy at hand. Further, a change in 
the dominant “image” of the policy instrument can lead to a shift in the venue of decision-
making and this may bring about an ideational change, undermining the bases of support for 
the prevailing policy valuation. Such a change will depend, among other factors, on policy-
image resilience (Mondou et al. 2014). New interpretations may also divert public attention to 
what (influential) network members who supported, or chose not to oppose, the policy’s initial 
overproduction consider unanticipated adverse outcomes. They can likewise expand electoral 
opportunities for politicians, as well as the political coalition for policy change, or undermine 
those opposing it by producing alternative cost-benefit calculations or by leveraging more pop-
ular mechanisms (e.g., market or non-market mechanisms). 
Regarding changes in the dynamics of contagion, gap-filling of distorted information that is 
perceived as an opinion may increase the complexity of the information, thereby increasing the 
need for reputation-sensitive individuals to seek social enforcement before deciding to adopt 
and act upon the new information (Centola 2018). Once individuals pay more attention to a 
behavior’s relative prevalence among most or all of their social contacts, weighing adopters 
against non-adopters, hubs are likely to become “infected” much later on and, once infected, 
will not be able to act effectively as accelerants. This is because, having spread the “infected” 
information to everyone they know, those recipients will weigh adopters against non-adopters 
before deciding to adopt the new information and act upon it.   
Distorted interbubble connectivity information which is perceived as an opinion also provides 
a great deal of leeway for strategic interaction and information manipulation by policy actors, 
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in ways that are rapidly changing according to technological developments. Further, those so-
cial networks exposed to such opinions may manifest multiple layers of strategic interactions. 
Highly connected policy entrepreneurs may withhold or distort information that will prove 
useful in understanding the objective value of the policy instrument. They may also attempt to 
change how people think about what is true and important, thus exerting a profound impact 
on the diffusion of information and social learning (Golub and Sadler 2016). They may interact 
with the media and utilize word of mouth, with important implications for social learning. 
Likewise, they can increase the likelihood of information awareness and act as amplifiers of 
supporting or undermining policy overproduction signals.
However, to what extent and in what direction are policy dynamics likely to change? To an-
swer this question, we integrate into our framework the role of network segregation in a social 
network that occurs “[…] when all the members of one class of persons are cut off from all 
relationships with all members of other classes” (Freeman 1978, 414). This term grasps agents’ 
tendency to associate with other agents who share similar characteristics, such as race, nation-
ality, gender and cognitive and behavioral characteristics — including personal tastes and the 
propensity to cooperate with others — as well as genetic traits. One example is separation in 
geographical space according to a slight ethnic preference in friendships and social interactions 
(e.g., Schelling 1971). 
In segregated networks, social ties tend to be limited within groups of similar people and large-
ly fail to expand to groups that differ in terms of some traits or sets of traits (Moody 2001). 
This, in turn, inhibits communication and learning across groups (e.g., Centola 2010), causing 
knowledge and behaviors to become localized in social space (McPherson et al. 2001). This has 
been increasingly noticeable with the advent of online social networks, particularly related 
to phenomena such as informational bubbles, opinion polarization and fake news (Lee et al 
2014). In addition, segregated networks may witness a relatively low level of tolerance towards 
members of other groups, inducing an additional level of heterogeneity (e.g., Aits et al 2019).
Hypotheses 
The variations in bubble connectivity information and patterns of social network segregation 
generate numerous hypotheses, as follows. 
H1. Distorted interbubble connectivity information which is perceived by individuals 
at the receiving end as a fact is likely to lead to a simple contagion process, thereby re-
sulting in a stronger and more sustainable inflated valuation of the policy instrument 
and, thus, a relatively stable and self-sustaining policy bubble at the receiving end.
Figure 1 provides a graphic representation of the relevant processes depicted here. The prem-
ise underlying this hypothesis is that, when distorted interbubble connectivity information 
is perceived by individuals at the receiving end as a fact, there is no need for gap-filling. They 
do not need to interpret the information they receive from others or decide whether they in-
tend to adopt and act upon the new information. The source bubble therefore operates as an 
exogenous factor, facilitating the diffusion of distorted information and limiting the effects of 
network segregation, if such effects indeed exist. 
In addition, the ease of information processing, which is characteristic of this relatively simple 
and clear type of perceived information, increases contact rates among network members at 
the receiving end, likewise limiting attempts by highly connected policy entrepreneurs to in-
terfere with the transmission of information that undermines the prevailing policy valuation 
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at the receiving end. Furthermore, increased contact rates among network members and the 
simplicity of perceived information can lead to more individuals joining the network, thereby 
increasing the number of “infected” members. These processes, combined together, may be 
likely to lead to a simple contagion process whereby the spread of information is viral in na-
ture and nearly automatic, with minimal effort and cost. This process solidifies the already 
distorted policy valuation at the receiving end, thereby contributing to bubble sustainment.
Figure 1.  Distorted interbubble connectivity information that is perceived as factual in 
non-segregated  social networks (Hypothesis I)
Distorted interbubble connectivity information that is transmitted via non-segregated social 
networks and is perceived as a fact
- No gap-filling by policy actors and individuals
- Lack of strategic interaction among policy entrepreneurs
Simple contagion process
- A hub is likely to become “infected” early
- Once the hub is infected, it acts as an accelerant
Increasing contact rate between and amongst 
policy actors and individuals due to ease of 
information processing
Stronger and more sustainable inflated valuation of the policy instrument at the receiving end
A relatively stable and self-sustaining policy bubble at the receiving end
Source: the Author
Even when distorted interbubble connectivity information that is perceived as a fact is in-
troduced via a new medium and/or at a level of intensity that crosses a tipping-point (e.g., a 
relatively high visual-emotional degree), the weak ties activated and/or the new ties created 
among network members do not interfere with the diffusion and social-learning processes. 
Rather, they create more channels for social/emotional contagion and amplification of the dis-
torted information transmitted from the source bubble. 
Distorted information that is perceived as a fact may also help people from similar backgrounds 
predict others’ behavior with more accuracy, as the rationale of the prevailing distorted policy 
valuation at the receiving end solidifies. Subsequently, this introduces another common di-
mension shared by supporters of the overproduction of the policy at hand and reduces the po-
tential for loss of confidence and for coordination failure, which occur when people are unsure 
of others’ actions or beliefs. 
H2. In non-segregated or less-segregated social networks, distorted interbubble-con-
nectivity information which is perceived as an opinion is likely to lead to highly com-
plex types of diffusion processes, the net impact of which can be either corrective or 
distortive insofar as the prevailing policy valuation at the receiving end is concerned.
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Figure 2 offers a graphic representation of the relevant processes depicted here. The network 
topology and the type of perceived information can influence information diffusion by modi-
fying contact rates, the dynamics of contagions and the diversity of policy valuations. When 
policy entrepreneurs fill the gaps in distorted interbubble-connectivity information that is per-
ceived as an opinion, this increases the complexity of interbubble connectivity information. 
This, in turn, may have two consequences. First, growing information complexity may decrease 
contact rates among network members as a result of increased difficulty in information pro-
cessing. This may inhibit information diffusion, leaving peoples’ opinions intact and, conse-
quently, sustaining the prevailing policy valuation. Second, growing information complexity 
may increase the need of reputation-sensitive individuals to seek social enforcement before 
deciding to adopt and act upon the new information (Centola 2018). Consequently, rather than 
spreading like viruses, hubs are likely to become “infected” much later (relative to cases involv-
ing simple information). Once infected, they will not be able to act effectively as accelerants 
because, having spread the “infected” information to everyone they know, these recipients will 
also weigh adopters against non-adopters. This, in turn, may stymie the spread of behaviors 
that play a role in the sustainment of the policy bubble at hand.
Figure 2.  Distorted interbubble connectivity information that is perceived as an opinion in 
non-segregated and less-segregated social networks (Hypothesis II)
Distorted interbubble connectivity information that is transmitted via non-segregated and less 
segregated social networks and is perceived as an opinion
- Gap-filling by policy entrepreneurs
- Multiple layers of strategic interactionamong policy actors
Growing complexity of information Increase in the diversity of policy valuations
Decreasing contact rates
among network members
Complex contagion The “dilution effect”
Decreasing information diffusion
Increasing information diffusion
Corrective or distortive net impact for the prevailing policy valuation at the receiving end
Bubble sustainment (for distortive net impact) or termination (for corrective net impact)
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However, such gap-filling of distorted interbubble connectivity information that is perceived 
as an opinion may also trigger a process with a contradictory outcome. In non-segregated or 
less-segregated networks, gap-filling of such information may increase the diversity of pol-
icy valuations, thereby “diluting” the prevailing policy valuation by allowing the correct policy 
valuation, or competing distorted valuations, to invade social networks successfully. For ex-
ample, a correct policy valuation, or competing distorted valuations perceived as an opinion, 
may trigger controversy within the professional community. Senior civil servants, themselves 
34 In te r n a t ion a l  R e v ie w o f  P ubl i c  Pol i c y,  2 :1
policy entrepreneurs who are attuned to controversy in the professional community, may act 
to correct the prevailing policy valuation, or deflate the policy bubble unilaterally, rather than 
rubber-stamping inflated levels of policy production. By the same token, correct interbubble 
connectivity information that is perceived as expert opinion may decrease the number of dis-
torted hosts. This, in turn, may signal to network members that correction of policy valuation 
is in order, thereby deflating the policy bubble. 
In addition, certain interpretations of interbubble connectivity information that is perceived 
as an opinion can cause a negative change in peoples’ perceptions regarding the worthiness of 
given policy-related actors or institutions and this, in turn, can have a knock-on effect on the 
worthiness of other actors, thus creating a form of information contagion that undermines 
the prevailing policy valuation. High policy-valuation richness can therefore reduce the risk of 
“infection” via the “dilution effect”. Increasing diversity in policy valuations might therefore 
increase information diffusion, the impact of which may undermine the prevailing policy valu-
ation. This may be a very slow process because “a new story correcting a false story may not be 
as contagious as the false story, which means that the false narrative may have a major impact 
on [...] activity long after it is corrected” (Shiller 2019, 97). 
 The net impact of decreasing information diffusion as a result of decreasing contact rates and 
the change in the dynamic of contagions caused by the growing complexity of new informa-
tion, on the one hand, and increasing information diffusion due to increasing diversity of poli-
cy valuations, on the other hand, can be either corrective or distortive insofar as the prevailing 
policy valuation at the receiving end is concerned. It depends on the relative importance of the 
former process versus that of the latter. 
H3. In segregated social networks within policy domains, distorted interbubble in-
formation that is perceived as an opinion is likely to lead to strategic diffusion ac-
companied by decreasing contact rates among network members, thereby resulting 
in a stronger and more sustainable inflated valuation of the policy instrument at the 
receiving end and, thus, a relatively stable or growing policy bubble at the receiving 
end.
Figure 3 provides a graphic representation of the relevant processes depicted here. In such 
contexts, policy actors can limit the expansion of imaginable, workable and plausible policy al-
ternatives within particular social groups in the following ways. First, they can take advantage 
of the multiple layers of strategic interactions by incorporating social network information 
in the design of influence strategies in a way that reduces waste of resources (e.g., targeting/
campaigning costs) and generates greater impact. This can be undertaken by strategic diffusion, 
that is by increasing or decreasing the optimal influence strategy (i.e., targeting individuals 
with low or high connections) depending on the content of the interaction (Galeotti and Goyal 
2009; see also Galeotti et al. 2013; Bloch et al. 2018; and Chatterjee and Dutta 2016; see also 
Galeotti and Goyal 2009).
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Figure 3.  Distorted interbubble connectivity information that is perceived as an opinion in 
segregated social networks (Hypothesis III) 
Distorted interbubble connectivity information that 
is transmitted via segregated  social networks and is 
perceived as an opinion
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- Gap-filling by policy entrepreneurs
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Poor learning and 
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A relative stable inflated valuation of the policy instrument at the receiving end
A relative stable and self-sustaining policy bubble at the receiving end
Source: The Author
Second, policy entrepreneurs and other policy actors can take advantage of the fact that infor-
mation can pass relatively slowly to inhibit the spread of certain interpretations deriving from 
competing opinions. Slow transmission of information may be caused by the growing com-
plexity of information — the derived consequences of which may be decreasing contact rates 
among network members across social groups and complex contagion within groups — as well 
as by the poor learning and communication across social groups that characterizes segregated 
social networks. Slow transmission of information allows policy actors more time to counter-
frame the status quo as the safer option, distort scientific facts, regulate populations who are 
at risk of becoming “corrected” (e.g., concerning closure in small social networks, see Coleman 
1988) and interfere with the transmission of particular policy valuation. Overall, these pro-
cesses support the inflated valuation of the policy instrument at the receiving end, leading to 
a relatively stable policy bubble at the receiving end.
When investigating the aforementioned processes, it is important to distinguish between the 
level of social network connectivity and the segregation patterns within a policy system, on 
the one hand, and the level of connectivity and segregation patterns among elite decision-
makers on the other. Both may be of vast significance in amplifying or dissipating information 
shocks to the system; yet, at the same time, such shocks can be triggered at one level. Gauging 
the net effect requires recognition of the conditions under which opinions will spread across 
the entire interacting network system, as compared with a spread to only one type of network 
(e.g., a social or elite network), with minimal isolated “distortions” on other network types. It 
also requires consideration of a situation wherein two or more pieces of distorted interbub-
ble connectivity information, which are perceived as opinions, spread within the same social 
network or within different networks and interact dynamically with one another. Depending 
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on the characteristics of social-network structure, network type can have either a profound or 
a minor effect on the spread of information from one policy bubble to another. Identifying the 
conditions in which these cases occur is vital to our understanding of interbubble dynamics. 
Needless to say, the effects of these patterns may vary according to policy contexts.
To sum up, a careful examination of network interaction patterns should help us disentangle 
information originating in one policy domain (e.g., wherein the target bubble originally devel-
oped) from that which is the product of another policy bubble (i.e., the source bubble) — both 
fuel the target bubble, together or separately. It also allows us to gauge deliberate choices made 
by policy entrepreneurs and other policy actors, operating within social network contexts, 
when spreading different types of information, and also their policy implications. Needless to 
say, the behavior of highly skilled policy entrepreneurs/actors operating in a network may af-
fect not only policy investment and production but also the evolution of the network and the 
resulting transmission of shocks and crises (e.g., Jackson 2016, 75). We now turn our attention 
to the relevant methodological toolbox.
Methodology
Before discussing the methodology, let us first articulate more accurately the relevant net-
work characteristics necessary for empirical measurement. The actors in the theoretical frame-
work are individuals. However, it is not impossible to have multi-modal networks, such as two 
modes — individuals and policy-relevant organizations — wherein individuals can also belong 
to organizations. Network mapping will reveal the level of influence wielded by policy entre-
preneurs, or “hubs,” which depends in part on the level of inter-nodal connections in his or 
her area of activity. This connectivity may be captured using Bonacich’s power centrality. More 
power means that a policy entrepreneur has a larger number of connections to less-connected 
nodes, while less power means that he or she has a larger number of connections to more well-
connected nodes.
Regarding the boundaries of the network, the policy actors in the framework advanced here 
are bounded by specific policy bubbles. The social tie used in the framework is information 
sharing (e.g., Facebook friends), but the information is not necessarily related to the policy 
bubbles. The criteria for segregation are the same as for the relational ties, namely informa-
tion sharing. Measuring diffusion of information may rely on behaviors that can be obtained 
from metadata, or inferred from messages. Measuring the impact of this diffusion can rely on 
policy-investment decisions in real and controlled settings. Identifying causal associations be-
tween social networks and outcomes of interest presents empirical challenges. These concerns 
may be addressed by pursuing multiple research strategies. I elaborate three options: big data 
analysis, agent-based modeling and experimentation.
Analyzing the information spreading patterns in multiple social networks can take advantage 
of the modern advances in data science. Important in this regard are the models developed so 
far to analyze the adaptive process in information diffusion, which are used to characterize the 
dynamic of opinion formation, such as models concerning social segregation (Gross and Bla-
sius, 2008; Nardini et al. 2008). Complex network structures can be uncovered by analyzing the 
online social networks that constitute the most important information spreading platforms. 
Complex patterns of information-spreading can likewise be gauged by analyzing instant mes-
sengers, Twitter, blogs and Facebook, as well as other networks that embed the rich informa-
tion spreading phenomenon, such as Instagram, Flickr, YouTube and so on. It is possible to 
analyze information spreading by focusing on information broadcasting, information sharing 
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and so on.  
Opinions also compete on social networks. Different opinions are distributed in the networks 
and interact with one another. This calls for the use of agent-based models (ABM) for under-
standing opinion competition dynamics and competitive diffusion processes on multiplex net-
works, where the networks are made up of different layers that comprise the same nodes and 
a given type of edges in each layer. As a hypothesis-generating method, ABM is an efficient 
way to examine theoretical explanations formally, to construct new expectations and gauge 
potentially surprising findings, to concretize theoretical puzzles by transforming hypotheses 
to mechanisms and to enrich networked experiments. There is abundant research on opinion 
dynamics over multiplex networks wherein agents interact with bounded confidence. A num-
ber of scholars have provided comprehensive surveys of this stream (Lorenz 2007; Castellano 
et al. 2009; see also Myers and Leskovec 2012; Antonopoulos and Shang 2018). This method 
may be relevant for understanding social contagion processes during which individuals who 
hold opinions regarding a policy instrument exchange views and compromise, if their opinions 
do not differ by more than a given threshold. It can also infuse meaning to empirical analysis of 
deductive- and ABM-derived expectations of interbubble dynamics by using massive date sets 
which represent large-scale social systems. 
Networked experiments provide another possible methodology that can help us to explore the 
implications of interdependencies for policy investment and production. Social settings may 
be randomized and engineered to enable exploration of the outcomes of social interaction and 
the unpacking of nuanced behavioral mechanisms that explain social effects. The ability to 
test complex dynamic hypotheses concerning social behavior has radically increased with the 
growth of digital tools such as Facebook applications and Amazon Mechanical Turk, as well as 
increasing collaboration with platform developers and website administrators (for a review, 
see Aral 2016). Notable examples include digital experiments concerning information sharing 
and diffusion (Bakshy et al. 2012). The design of networked experiments (i.e., setting, sam-
pling, randomization and treatment assignment), as well as the analysis of such experiments, 
are discussed elsewhere (Aral 2016). Lab experiments manipulating policy bubbles provide a 
further avenue for testing the analytical framework advanced here (for a review of lab experi-
ments in information flows through varying network structures, see Choi et al. 2016, 465–7). 
Lab experiments could be used, for example, to gauge the extent to which factual informa-
tion is transformed into opinions as it is transmitted through the network (e.g., whether an 
individual believes “official statistics” depends on the source from which he/she hears them). 
Researchers can also gauge causal estimations of network effects by implementing exogenous 
network structures in the lab (Choi et al. 2016). 
Regarding the identification of interbubble dynamics and the measurement of policy bubbles, 
the focus should be placed on the shared information set, as well as on the direct indicators 
of the policy problem and on government investment in a policy instrument in order to gauge 
the degree of overinvestment in a policy tool relative to the severity of the policy problem. In 
addition, changes in the macropolitical agenda might be gauged by measuring fluctuations in 
the extent of media coverage because media attention plays a key role in processes of social and 
emotional contagion and, subsequently, links fluctuations in media attention to the life-cycle 
of a policy bubble. 
A potential shared information set is, for example, the basic emotion of disgust (Kam and Estes 
2016). Scholars may draw on recent findings regarding how individual differences in disgust 
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sensitivity (Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2009; see also Inbar et al. 2012; Terrizzi et al. 2010) in-
form demand for policies in different domains that are designed to protect citizens from physi-
cal, moral and imaginary contamination (Kam and Estes 2016). They may therefore examine 
the existence of potential interbubble dynamics in the policy domains of food protection, wa-
ter pollution, immigration, abortion, gay marriage, stem-cell research, euthanasia and medical 
marijuana. These policy areas are of interest because: (i) they are independent from economic 
bubbles and therefore are not the consequences of economic bubbles and thus they can develop 
under a variety of circumstances; (ii) they are characterized by strong indicators of the severity 
of the policy problem; and (iii) they are distinct and very different policy areas in substantive 
terms, thereby increasing the potential of generalization, should common patterns of inter-
bubble dynamics emerge across policy sectors. Utilizing the aforementioned research strate-
gies may highlight patterns and provide confirmation or disconfirmation of the assumptions 
and hypotheses advanced here.
Conclusions
Over the past few years, political scientists established the plausibility of policy bubbles, prin-
cipally claiming that such bubbles are fueled by self-reinforcing processes and contagion, yet 
ignoring the possible impact of interdependence between complex policy systems on the sus-
tainment of policy bubbles. To improve our understanding of such a complex phenomenon, 
this article utilizes robust findings in the study of how information and behavior spread in the 
social sphere to develop an analytical framework in which one policy bubble is viewed as a site 
for producing information that may fuel another. Regardless of the dynamics at play, the mere 
act of locating information sets that are shared among policy bubbles across policy sectors, 
levels of government, states and other jurisdictions brings the problem of bubble sustainment 
into sharper focus than ever before. It can assist efforts to identify policy bubbles and poten-
tially contribute to the debate concerning how to respond to suspected policy bubbles. 
Considering that diffusion processes “tie in very closely to the basic architecture of a popula-
tion’s network” (Jackson et al. 2017, 66), the article develops a social network perspective 
on interbubble dynamics. A social network perspective provides powerful tools for analyzing 
information diffusion processes, as well as the extent of contagion which depends to a great 
extent on network structure. It captures the potential effects of large-scale network structure 
on aggregate behaviors and outcomes, in addition directing attention to variations between so-
cieties with regard to the sustainment of policy bubbles (e.g., fragmented societies may exhibit 
more fragmented networks). Further, such a perspective allows us to develop conceptual in-
sights of a realistic nature. One reason for this lies in the network concept that “does not imply 
equilibrium orientation, and involves much lower integration” (Schneider and Bauer 2016, 74). 
Another relates to the fact that, even when people are not familiar with the details of networks, 
they instinctively impart information to others who share their demographics. As complicat-
ed objects, the article considers it useful to simplify networks by focusing on one property, 
namely network segregation. This conceptual strategy enables demonstration of the potential 
importance of network segregation in transmitting interbubble connectivity information. 
Taken together, the added value of a social network perspective on interbubble dynamics can 
potentially explain empirical regularities manifesting in policy bubble processes. Specifically, 
by applying a multi-network logic and imposing multiple policy domains on bubbly policy pro-
cesses, a social network perspective can widen the number of mechanisms that may exist for 
policy bubble sustainment. An empirical examination guided by this perspective can reveal the 
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role played by interbubble dynamics (or the lack thereof) alongside self-reinforcing processes 
and contagion. This is the article’s main contribution.
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